Abstract -The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) 
1 The principal feature of this legislation was the reduction in individual income tax rates, including lowering of the top statutory rate from 39.6 percent to 35 percent and adding a new ten percent bracket. Reducing marginal tax rates was intended to improve the economic incentives to work and invest and reduce the other economic distortions associated with high tax rates, as well as lower overall tax burdens and improve the prospects for economic growth. 2 This paper focuses on the effects of the lower marginal tax rates. It begins with a brief overview of the law changes and some historical background. The rest of the paper presents new evidence on the taxable income response using a panel of individual income tax returns that spans the period in which EGTRRA and JGTRRA were enacted.
ENACTMENT OF EGTTRA AND JGTRRA
The key elements of then-Governor Bush's tax program were laid out in a policy speech in December 1999 (Bush, 1999) . The primary goal was to improve economic incentives by reducing marginal tax rates. Another key theme and rationale for the tax reductions was that taxes had increased to the highest percentage of GDP during peacetime (i.e., since World War II). The previous fi ve-rate income tax structure (15, 28, 31, 36 and 39.6 percent) was to be replaced with four lower rates (10, 15, 25 and 33 percent). The child credit was to be doubled from $500 to $1,000 and, to reduce the marriage penalty, the ten percent "second earner" deduction for two-income married couples was to be restored. 3 The estate tax (popularized as the "death" tax) was to be repealed. The annual contribution limits on Education Savings Accounts were to be increased substantially and expanded to include education down to the kindergarten level. A charitable deduction was to be provided for non-itemizers. Equity concerns were addressed by ensuring that taxpayers with the lowest incomes would receive the largest percentage reductions in income taxes. 4 Overall, half of the revenue cost of the income tax cuts was to be used for provisions primarily benefi ting lowerand middle-income households: a new ten percent bracket on the fi rst $12,000 of taxable income for married couples ($6,000 for other taxpayers) and the increased child credit. The level at which a four-person family would start to pay income taxes was to be increased to $35,000 (from about $28,000 in 1999). The maximum income tax rate was to be limited to 33 percent to promote entrepreneurship and ensure that no taxpayers would pay more than one-third of their income in income taxes. In response to a similar set of proposals made once President Bush was elected in 2000, Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which was signed into law on June 7, 2001 , and included most of the Administration proposals with some modifications. 5 The new individual income tax rates were 10, 15, 25, 33 and 35 percent and were to be gradually phased in by 2006. 6 The 35 percent top rate represented a modest compromise from the 33 percent proposed top rate and took the top rate roughly half way back from the 39.6 percent rate enacted in 1993 to the 31 percent top rate effective for 1991 (see Figure 1) . 7 To provide marriage penalty 3 Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, a second earner deduction allowed a deduction of ten percent of the fi rst $30,000 of earnings of the lower earning spouse on a joint tax return. The effect was to reduce the effective marginal tax rates on the second earner in a two-earner couple. This temporary provision expired in 1986 and was not extended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 4 There are, of course, other measures of fairness in considering the distribution of tax burdens, such as measures of after-tax income, tax progressivity and shares of taxes paid as compared to shares of income. 5 Congress acted relatively quickly as the House version passed on May 16 and the Senate version on May 23.
The conference report was fi led on May 26 and passed the same day by both the House and the Senate. 6 The original schedule for the phase-in of lower rates in EGTRRA was:
EGTRRA Phase-in of Tax Rates   2000 2001 -2003 2004-2005 2006-2010 39.6 38.6 37. 6  35   36  35  34  33   31  30  29  28   28  27  26  25 7 Interestingly, the 1993 increase in the top rate to 39.6 percent took the top rate about half way back from the 28 percent top rate under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) to the previous top rate of 50 percent.
relief, Congress increased the size of the 15 percent bracket and increased the basic standard deduction for joint returns to twice the amount for single returns. This was in lieu of restoring the second earner deduction. To address concerns about inadequate private saving and increase incentives for retirement saving, Congress added provisions that expanded the contribution limits for IRAs and other defi ned contribution plans, noting that the IRA contribution limits had not changed since 1981. Education provisions included increasing the annual contribution limits for (later re-named Coverdell) education savings accounts to $2,000, increasing the income limits for eligibility to contribute, expanding coverage to elementary and secondary education expenses, and allowing tax-free distributions from Section 529 plans. 8 To keep the total tax reductions within the amounts allocated for tax cuts in the budget resolution, Congress phased in most provisions over several years and provided that most provisions would expire after 2010. While the enacted legislation differed somewhat from the President's original proposals, it met the primary Administration goals of reducing marginal tax rates, reducing the overall level of taxes, and providing larger percentage reductions in taxes to families and lower income households.
In response to the perceived slow pace of economic recovery from the 2001 recession and concerns over a possible double-dip recession, on January 7, 2003, President Bush proposed an economic growth package that would accelerate the phase-ins of many of the provisions 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 previously enacted, such as the marginal tax rate reductions, expansion of the child credit, marriage penalty relief, and increased expensing for small businesses.
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In addition, the 2003 growth package included a new dividend tax proposal to eliminate the double taxation of corporate income, which was intended to increase business investment during the economic recovery and improve incentives for economic growth in the longer term. The dividend tax proposal addressed a long-standing problem with the income tax system. Even after the reduction in the top individual tax rate, the effective total top tax rate on corporate income from a new equity-fi nanced corporate investment could be quite high-up to 57.8 percent-considering Federal corporate and individual income taxes.
10,11 Such high tax rates tend to discourage investment in the corporate sector and lead to various economic distortions such as a bias toward excessive debt relative to equity finance. High tax rates on dividends also raise corporate governance issues because corporate executives face reduced pressure to justify retaining corporate earnings rather than paying dividends, which in turn would allow stockholders to choose where to invest those funds.
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The dividend tax proposal would have exempted dividends that had been taxed at the corporate level from the individual income tax and eliminated the capital gains tax to the extent that capital gains represented retained earnings previously taxed at the corporate level. Under this proposal, investments in both corporate and non-corporate businesses would be taxed at a maximum rate of 35 percent.
By Carroll, Hassett, and Mackie (2003) analyze the effects of double taxation and dividend tax relief. 11 This conclusion is based on the traditional view of the effects of dividend taxes. In contrast under the new view in which new investment is funded from retained earnings, dividend taxes are capitalized into share prices and have no lasting effect on a fi rm's investment decisions or dividend policy. Auerbach and Hassett (2003) found evidence that there is signifi cant heterogeneity among US fi rms, with some exhibiting behavior consistent with the new view and others behavior consistent with the traditional view. Hassett (2004) concluded that about half of fi rms seem consistent with each of the views. 12 According to Chiang, Frankfurter, and Kosedag (2005) , approximately 1,200 corporations offer dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPS). Such plans offer shareholders the option of reinvesting their dividends in the company or gradually withdrawing their investment for consumption or reinvestment elsewhere. 13 Previously, long-term capital gains were generally taxed at 10 and 20 percent rates and dividends were taxed at ordinary rates. An eight percent rate applied to gains otherwise taxed at the ten percent rate if the asset had been held over fi ve years. In contrast to the Administration proposal, the JGTRRA capital gains tax rate reduction applied to all capital gains, including those from the sale of assets not subject to the double tax on corporate income. A general rule of thumb is the gains from corporate stock sales are roughly half of total capital gains, although this varies with the state of the economy and stock and real estate markets. of the income tax by some traditional measures of progressivity.
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PLACING EGTRRA AND JGTRRA INTO HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The marginal tax rate reductions in EGTRRA and JGTRRA can also be viewed in the context of longer-term changes in the tax system. Figure 2 shows the income ranges for selected statutory tax rate brackets in effect since 1964. The tax brackets are adjusted to 2007 income levels to account for both the effects of infl ation and changes in real incomes.
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The effects of real bracket creep are evident as well as the changes in top income tax rates over time. For example, the 70 percent bracket affected taxpayers with incomes of about $1.4 million (in terms of 2007 incomes) in 1965, but it affected taxpayers with incomes of about $700,000 by the time this rate was repealed in 1982.
18
The 50 percent bracket affected taxpayers at gradually lower incomes through the 1960s and 1970s, and the reductions in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 roughly brought this tax bracket back to the levels of 1965. The higher tax rates were eliminated altogether from 1988 to 1992, but the 39.6 percent rate came back in 1993. 19 In the recent period, the 35 per- Notes: Income is a measure of cash income that includes all sources of income subject to tax plus non-taxable Social Security benefi ts, non-taxable pensions and tax exempt interest less state income tax refunds included in AGI. Table excludes dependent fi lers and the income and taxes paid by taxpayers with negative cash income.
16 But see Elmendorf, Furman, and Gale (2008) for an alternative view that progressivity should be measured by the percent change in after-tax income. With a progressive tax, it is much more diffi cult for across-the-board or broad tax reductions to pass the after-tax income standard for progressivity. For example, as shown in Table 2 , under 2000 law the effective tax rate for 2005 would have been 24.9 percent for the top one percent and 2.3 percent for the second quintile. In computing the percent change, the denominator is, thus, reduced by 24.9 percent for the top one percent but only 2.3 percent for the second quintile. Thus, the tax changes resulted in a larger percentage change in the after-tax income of the top one percent (4.9 percent versus 4.2 percent) even though taxes were reduced by a larger percentage of gross income for the second quintile (4.1 percentage points versus 3.7 percentage points). 17 Incomes are adjusted to the change in median incomes for a four-person family to account for both infl ation and real income growth. 18 The analysis for Figure 2 is somewhat simplifi ed as it is based only on the taxable income brackets, personal exemptions and the standard deductions. If typical itemized deductions were used, the income cutoffs would be somewhat higher, and the downward slopes would be slightly steeper due to the gradual repeal of some previously available itemized deductions. The analysis also ignores the alternative minimum tax (AMT), which has only affected signifi cant numbers of taxpayers in recent years. In addition, Figure 2 simplifi es by combining certain statutory rates (such as 35 and 36 percent, and 39.6 and 40 percent). 19 Including the effects of the phaseout of itemized deductions that affects many higher-income taxpayers, the top rate was 40.788 percent (39.6 * (1 + 0.03)). 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE EGTRRA AND JGTRRA
In addition to the positive incentive effects from reducing marginal tax rates, EGTRRA and JGTRRA had other economic effects, including short-run economic stimulus effects in an economy in recession, effects on defi cits and the national debt, and potential effects on long-term economic growth. Simulations by the Joint Committee on Taxation (2003) using three alternative models, for example, estimated that JGTRRA would increase real GDP growth rates by 0.2 to 0.9 percentage points, employment by 0.2 to 0.8 percent and the non-residential capital stock by 0.1 to 1.5 percent during the 2003-2008 period, but output and employment would decline during the following fi ve years because of the expiration of the provisions and crowding out of investment from the larger deficits. 21 In addition, the simulations estimated that the revenue feedback from the macroeconomic stimulus could offset 5.8 to 27.5 percent of the revenue cost relative to the conventional estimate. The long-term effects of extending EGTRRA and JGTRRA were examined by Foertsch and Rector (2008) who estimated that GDP and investment would average 0.8 percent higher, employment would be 0.6 percent higher and the personal savings rate would increase by about one percent of personal income over the 2011-2017 period. 22 Other analyses, however, concluded that increased defi cits resulting from EGTRRA and JGTRRA could reduce national savings and economic growth in the longer term through crowding-out effects. 23 The rest of this paper focuses primarily on the effects of lowering marginal tax rates on the reporting of taxable income.
EVIDENCE ON THE TAXABLE INCOME RESPONSE TO LOWER INCOME TAX RATES
One approach for evaluating the overall effect of the lower tax rates is to estimate their effect on taxpayers' reported taxable income in the tradition of studies estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to changes in income tax rates. 24 21 Results from the Global Insight Macroeconomic Model implied that JGTRRA would increase real GDP growth rates by 1.5 percentage points, employment by 0.8 percent and the non-residential capital stock by 1.5 percent.
In two other JCT models, the Macroeconomic Equilibrium Growth (MEG) Model and an overlapping generations life cycle (OLG) model, the short-term economic benefi ts were much smaller (0.2-0.3 percentage point increase in real GDP and 0.2 to 0.4 percent increases in employment). These estimates were done in May 2003 of H.R. 2, shortly before the fi nal passage of JGTRRA. 22 Foertsch and Rector (2008) use the Global Insight Macroeconomic Model and a microsimulation model for their analysis. 23 For example, see Auerbach (2002) and Gale and Orszag (2004) . 24 For example, see Feldstein (1995) , Auten and Carroll (1999) , Carroll (1998) , Giertz (2004 Giertz ( , 2007 , Goolsbee (2000) , Moffi tt and Wilhelm (2000) , and Gruber and Saez (2002) .
This paper uses a panel of tax returns spanning the enactment of EGTRRA and JGTRRA to estimate to what extent the lower tax rates resulted in higher taxable incomes than would have otherwise been reported. As in the previous literature investigating taxable income responses in prior periods, the approach used here uses the fact that both Federal and state tax rates changed differently for different taxpayers to identify the taxable income response.
Since the reductions in marginal tax rates were relatively modest (recall that the top rate went only half way back to the 1992 level) and fairly uniform across the higher brackets, one might expect difficulty in identifying the taxable income response. 25 The estimation task is further complicated by the bursting of the stock market bubble beginning in 2000 and the subsequent recession that roughly coincided with, and provided part of the motivation for, the acceleration of the lower tax rates. Furthermore, the tax reductions were originally scheduled to be phased in gradually, so that the observed behavior may include some taxpayers that postponed their responses until the lower rates became effective.
The panel data used for this analysis consist of a large sample of tax returns for tax years 1999 through 2005. Similar to the panel used by Auten and Carroll (1999) , this panel consists of the tax returns present in the Statistics of Income (SOI) individual income tax fi les across the seven years with an appropriate weighting strategy applied to control for endogenous sample selection. The basic sample includes over 168,000 tax returns of taxpayers who were single, married or head of household, whose marital status did not change over this period and whose base year total income (including tax-exempt interest) was $50,000 or more in 2000 dollars. A more detailed discussion of the weighting strategy and the sample restrictions is provided in the Appendix.
The basic model uses a three-year difference model (similar to Gruber and Saez (2002) ). An alternative model looks at income in 2000 and 2005, before and after the tax changes (Feldstein (1995) and Auten and Carroll (1999) ), because of the potential for shifting of income and deductions in years immediately preceding and following tax changes (see, for example, Sammartino and Weiner (1997) and Goolsbee (2000) ) and because it may take longer than two or three years for taxpayers to fully adjust to changes in income tax rates.
Empirical Model
Following the approach used in prior studies, the empirical model regresses the change in the logarithm of income against the change in the logarithm of one minus the tax rate (the net-of-tax rate) and a number of additional variables included to control for key taxpayer characteristics. Income is defined as the difference in the natural logarithm of taxable income excluding capital gains realizations and is defl ated to 2000 levels using the consumer price index (CPI). 26 First differencing has the effect of eliminating individual specifi c effects from the data. The additional socio-economic variables are included to control for nontax factors that may have affected income growth during the period.
Thus, the basic model used for estimation takes the form
where Δ denotes the difference between year t and t -3, TI is a taxpayer's taxable income (excluding capital gains), τ is a taxpayers tax rate, X is a set of control variables for a variety of taxpayer characteristics, δ is a time effect, and ε is the error term.
The net-of-tax share, defi ned as one minus a taxpayer 's combined Federal-state marginal tax rate (1 -τ i ), was calculated using detailed tax calculators designed to capture the major features of the individual income tax. 27 An instrumental variables procedure was used to control for the endogeneity of the net-of-tax share that uses a taxpayer's initial or lagged income (TI t-3 ) to calculate the "synthetic" change in a taxpayer's net-of-tax rate that captures only exogenous shifts in the tax rate schedule. 28 This approach is similar to the use of initial income to group taxpayers in the difference of difference calculations of Feldstein (1995) , and the instruments developed by Auten and Carroll (1999) and Moffi tt and Wilhelm (2000) , which rely on taxpayer characteristics in the initial period. The instrument is then used with the other independent variables to estimate fi tted values of (1 -τ i ), which were used in place of a taxpayer's actual tax price in the fi nal estimating equation.
Additional independent variables are a taxpayer's fi nancial income and wealth, age and age-squared, marital status, number of children, an entrepreneurship dummy, regional dummy variables, and occupation/industry dummy variables. Taxpayer wealth is likely to infl uence a taxpayer's ability to alter portfolios and labor arrangements in response to tax changes and may also result in income changes that are unrelated to tax-induced behavioral responses if the assets provide above-or below-average returns. For example, taxpayers could experience low income growth because they hold short-term interest-bearing assets when interest rates fall or corporate equity when corporate earnings and dividends fall. The sum of a taxpayer's dividend and interest income (including tax-exempt interest) is used as a proxy for individual holdings of fi nancial assets to control for a taxpayer's potential for income growth arising from base-year asset holdings.
A dummy variable is included to indicate whether a taxpayer reports income from a sole proprietorship, partnership, or subchapter S corporation. This variable may refl ect not only ownership of business assets, but also entrepreneurial skills, education and the propensity for risk-taking. Age and age-squared are included to control for life cycle effects. A dummy variable for married taxpayers and the number of children are included to control for the effects of family status on income growth. Regional and occupation dummy variables are included because differences in regional and industry growth, or returns to skill and human capital may also infl uence a taxpayer's income growth. Year dummies are included to 27 Because of the change in the tax treatment of dividends, the tax rate was calculated as a weighted average of the marginal tax rates on wages, dividends and other non-gains income. State tax rates were developed and provided to the authors by Dan Feenberg using TAXSIM and are based on a lookup table for state marginal rates for taxpayers by AGI class, marital status, number of dependents, receipt of Social Security income, year and state. 28 The instrumental variable is the log difference in the net-of-tax rate in year t based on a taxpayer's income and characteristics in year t -3 and the net-of-tax rate in year t -3. Thus, this variable only refl ects the change in the net-of-tax rate resulting from the change in the tax law, but not any changes in a taxpayer's income or characteristics.
control for year-specifi c effects such as the state of the economy.
Estimation Results
Parameter estimates for all variables included in the base specification are reported in Table 3 . The key parameter of interest-the taxable income elasticity-is positive and statistically signifi cant with a value of 0.39 (s.e. = 0.08), which is within the range of estimates of prior studies and similar to the Gruber-Saez (2002) estimate. 29 Thus, the base model indicates an economically and statistically relevant response to the lower tax rates in EGTRRA and JGTRRA, even after controlling for a number of other variables.
The effects of a few of the other independent variables are worth noting. As in most prior studies, the base-year income variable used to control for mean-reversion in incomes is highly statistically significant. The year dummies were Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of taxable income in year t minus the logarithm of taxable income in year t -3. Estimates are two-stage least squares. The instrument for the endogenous tax variable is the change in the taxpayer's after-tax share evaluated at the taxpayer's real income in the base-year period and the law of the current tax year t.
statistically signifi cant and negative with the most negative effect in 2003 near the bottom of the recession. 30 All of the coeffi cients for the occupation dummies were statistically different than zero. The effects of occupation, however, must be interpreted with care. In addition to a taxpayer's skill and human capital, occupation may also refl ect a taxpayer's fl exibility for rearranging affairs in response to changes in tax rates. For example, doctors, lawyers, and the self-employed have considerable fl exibility to alter their work schedules and compensation arrangements in response to the tax rate changes.
31
Alternative Specifi cations and Samples
The results for the taxable income elasticity for a number alternative specifi cations and samples are reported in Table 4 to consider the robustness and sensitivity of the results. The estimated taxable income elasticity for the "taxes only" specifi cation, which includes only a constant term, the tax variable, initial income for each period, and year dummies, is 0.37 (s.e. = 0.08). This result is roughly the same as the base specifi cation, but lower than some earlier research that, in effect, excluded non-tax factors from the model (for example, see Feldstein (1995) , Navratil (1995), and Lindsey (1987) ).
Taxpayers age 62 and over were excluded from the base sample because retirement decisions could bias estimates of the taxable income elasticity. Older taxpayers might also, in general, have less ability to adjust their taxable income to the extent they are no longer in the labor force and are more reliant on less controllable income sources. In addition, since some or all of their Social Security income may be excluded from the tax base, taxpayers who retire over the period examined may report a drop in taxable income for that reason. Including older taxpayers increases the size of the sample and lowers the estimated elasticity slightly to 0.36. While AMT taxpayers were included in the sample used for the base specifi cation, tax rate changes may have had different effects on these taxpayers because they are subject to a different, but parallel, tax system with a different rate schedule and tax base. Excluding AMT taxpayers leaves the estimated taxable income elasticity unchanged at 0.39.
In an equation using only Federal income tax rates, the estimated taxable income elasticity declines by about one-third to 0.27, but remains statistically signifi cant. This suggests that identifi cation of tax rate effects from the Federal rate alone is diffi cult over this period and that part of the identifi cation comes from differences in state income tax rates. In an equation using total non-gains income as the dependent variable, the total income elasticity was estimated to be 0.27. Some other studies have weighted the regressions by income since that may provide a more appropriate elasticity for predicting changes in total income. In this case, however, weighting by income made little difference as the estimated elasticity was 0.40, only marginally higher. This may have been the result of limiting the sample to taxpayers with base year incomes of $50,000 or more. This seemed to be confi rmed when the sample was expanded to include taxpayers with base year income of $15,000. With the expanded sample, the estimated elasticity was 0.16 when estimated with return weights, but 0.38 when using income weights. 30 While they are included to control for year-specifi c non-tax effects, the year dummies effectively remove the effect of changing the level of tax rates, leaving only differential changes in tax rates and state tax rates to identify the effects of tax rate changes. 31 These variables also may control for transitory changes in income to the extent that, for example, the self-employed tend to have volatile income and some executives may tend to have very high income for relatively short periods.
Another useful innovation suggested by Kopczuk (2005) is the use of measures of both permanent and transitory income measures to control for mean reversion. Thus, the income control variables are the log of income in the year prior to the base year and the change in the log of incomes between the base year and the prior year. While both variables were strongly statistically significant, the estimated net-of-tax elasticity changed only slightly to 0.36, although the standard error was reduced slightly.
One limitation of using changes in income over relatively short, fi xed time periods (three years in this study) to estimate the effects of taxes is that many of the change periods may not be economically meaningful in the sense that taxpayers may not be focused on the small or random changes in marginal tax rates that occur. That is, the ratio of signal to noise may be quite low over some time periods. Furthermore, it may take taxpayers longer than a few years to respond to the changed incentives. To get a longer term estimate of the effects of the tax rate changes, we estimated a model using the changes in income and tax rates from 2000 (the year prior to the rate cuts) to 2005 (the last available year). These years should be relatively free of short-run shifting effects. This longer-term model results in an estimated taxable income elasticity of 0.67, considerably larger than in the base model. This larger response could refl ect a greater response with the longer time to adjust to the lower rates, although the longer period also means that some of this larger response could be due to secular income trends.
Effect on Revenues
The taxable income elasticity results reported above can be used to simulate the taxable income response and the extent to which the revenue response reduces the revenue cost of lower tax rates, that is, the revenue offset. The simulations focus on the effects of reducing the top two tax rates from 39.6 percent to 35 percent and from 36 percent to 33 percent using the 2005 fi le. The simulations assume a 0.4 taxable income elasticity for taxpayers who would have faced the 36 and 39.6 percent tax rates.
32 If the 2000 tax law and rates still applied to these high-income taxpayers and they continued to report the same taxable income, they would have owed $271 billion in additional taxes. However, the simulation shows that taxpayers would have reduced total reported taxable income by $279 billion, which would have reduced revenues by $109 billion. Overall, the increase in taxable income translates into higher revenues that offset about 39 percent of the static revenue loss associated with the reduction in the top two tax rates. This simulation does not consider possible offsets from tax base shifting, however. The taxable income response can be attributed to many different sources, such as higher wages associated with greater work effort, a shifting away from nontaxable fringe benefits, changes in deferred compensation, changes in the composition of portfolios, less reliance on tax deductible home mortgage debt, or greater compliance.
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CONCLUSIONS
While EGTRRA and JGTRRA differed somewhat from the Administration's original tax proposals, they met the primary goals of reducing marginal tax rates, reducing the overall level of taxes, and providing larger percentage reductions in taxes to families and lower-income households. The number of taxpayers facing marginal tax rates of 40 percent or more was reduced from 1.8 million to 0.4 million and taxpayers throughout the distribution moved to lower rate brackets or to non-taxable status. The total level of Federal taxes was reduced from a peacetime high of 20.7 percent of GDP in 2000 to 18.8 percent of GDP in FY2007 (CEA, 2008) , which was relatively close to the 40-year average of 18.3 percent. Using a panel of tax returns, the paper examines the taxable income response to the reductions in marginal tax rates and estimates an elasticity of about 32 To the extent that taxpayers with the highest incomes have a larger response as found by Heim (2008) , this approach may understate the magnitude of the revenue offset. On the other hand, the long-run revenue offset could be overstated to the extent that some of the observed behavior refl ects shifting between the individual and corporate tax bases (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000) or refl ects the recovery from the recession in 2004 and 2005, which was likely partly due to the macroeconomic effects of the tax cuts. Carroll and Hrung (2005) discuss issues in applying taxable income elasticities. 33 Feldstein (1997 Feldstein ( , 1999 and Slemrod (2001) discuss the sources of behavioral responses. Poterba and Samwick (2003) show the effects of changing tax rates on the composition of portfolios. 
APPENDIX: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The panel of tax returns used for the regression analysis was constructed from IRS Statistics of Income fi les for tax years 1999 through 2005. Tax returns are present in this panel for two reasons. First, the cross-sectional files contain a random sample of Continuous Work History Survey returns. During this period, the SOI fi les included a purely random sample at a rate of 1/2000. Second, the sampling design of the SOI fi les incorporates a high degree of overlap over time. Tax returns are retained with certainty if they remain in strata with the same sampling rate or higher. The probability of remaining in the sample for returns that move between strata with different sampling rates can be determined from the respective sampling weights. A representative panel can be constructed by weighting the tax returns included in the panel by the maximum weight over the respective years. 34 The purely random nature of the CWHS component ensures a large number of lower-and moderate-income returns, while the overlap component combined with the high degree of income stratifi cation of the annual SOI fi les ensures a large number of high-income returns.
The set of tax returns used for estimation is limited to abstract from taxpayer characteristics not likely to be related to tax-induced behavioral responses, but that could affect a taxpayer's reported income. The estimation sample, for example, includes only tax returns fi ling as single, joint or head-of-household, but excludes returns that change fi ling status during the period to prevent marriage and dissolution due to divorce or death of a spouse from influencing the estimated behavioral response. To abstract from the effect of retirement decisions, taxpayers who are over age 61 are excluded. Taxpayers under age 21 in the base year are excluded because income changes for many of these taxpayers refl ect the completion of schooling and entry into the work force. In the base specifi cation, tax returns with gross income (defi ned to include tax-exempt interest) below $50,000 (in $2000) were also excluded from the sample because many of these taxpayers have zero taxable income or negative tax liability through the EITC and refundable child tax credit, and may be an unsuitable control group for higher income taxpayers.
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After the sample restrictions are imposed for the base specifi cation, the panel contains 163,996 observations with 51,671 observations attributable to the purely random CWHS component and the remaining primarily high-income tax returns due to the overlap built into the design of the SOI fi les. Generally phased in over time and permanent.
Lowering marginal tax rates increases incentives to work and invest and reduces tax distortions of economic decision-making. The new 10% bracket reduces marginal tax rates faced by low-income families.
Lower marginal tax rates increase incentives to work and invest and reduce tax distortions of economic decisions.
Reduce tax burdens on families.
Reduce taxes and marginal tax rates by extending the 15% tax bracket to income that would otherwise by taxed at 25%.
The estate tax raises issues of fairness by taxing income already taxed when it was earned. In addition, combined rates can approach 70%. Repeal would Increase capital for small businesses, which often cannot fully benefi t from special provisions.
Addresses concerns about adequacy of individual saving save for retirement and the low national savings rate. Contribution limits had not been increased since 1981.
Repeal of phaseout of itemized deductions (Pease provision)
